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Abstract 
 
The purpose of this paper is to increase current empirical evidence on the relevance of 
real options for explaining firm investment decisions in oligopolistic markets. We 
study an actual investment case in the Spanish mobile telephony industry, the 
entrant in the market of a new operator, Yoigo. We analyze the option to abandon in 
order to show the relevance of the possibility of sale the company in an oligopolistic 
market where competitors are not allowed free entrance. The NPV of the new entrant 
is calculated as a starting point. Then, and based on the general approach proposed 
by Copeland and Antikarov (2001), a binomial tree is used to model managerial 
flexibility in discrete time periods, and value the option to abandon. The strike price of 
the option is calculated based in incremental EBITDA margins due to selling 
customers or merging with a competitor. 
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VALUATION OF A NEW ENTRANT IN AN OLIGOPOLISTIC MARKET, 
INCLUDING ITS OPTION TO ABANDON. A REAL-LIFE CASE 
 
 
1. INTRODUCTION  
 
Understanding the valuation of new entrants in a market is a central theme in contemporary 
business, especially when considering startup companies. It is widely acknowledged that 
traditional valuations based on Net Present Value (NPV) use estimations with a high degree 
of uncertainty –such as future cash flows of a company with a limited track record–. The NPV 
approach neither takes into account the value of some options that these startup companies 
bear, such as the option to growth or the option abandon the market. 
To solve certain restrictions intherent in NPV, we can use real option valuation that 
emerged from the proposal by Myers in 1977. Real option valuation considers active 
management of corporate investments and, therefore, the value of their flexibility. In addition, 
this model takes into account non-monetary outcomes arriving from previous resource 
allocations and which become as a source of new opportunities for future decisions of the firm.  
In this paper we try to increase current empirical evidence on the relevance of real 
options for explaining firm investment decisions through the study of the entrant of a new 
competitor in the mobile telecommunications industry. Real Options valuation is very suitable in 
this industry, due to the future growth opportunities in the telecoms industry, the huge 
investments required and uncertainties embedded in the market, which are key elements in 
justifying the real option valuation methodology (Riihimäki, 2009).  
Aditionally, the nature of the industry, an oligopolistic market where competitors are not 
allowed free entrance, is considered in order to evaluate the significance of real options 
embedded in the investment. Thus, we analyze the option to abandon as the main real option, 
due to the fact that in this industry, there are economies of scale that allow bigger players enjoy 
better margins. Consequently, new entrants have the option to sell their business to incumbent 
companies (already established players), which are able to extract more value from the same 
customer base, increasing its total size and having access to higher margins. As a recent real 
example it can be mentioned what happened in the UK in 2009 when T-Mobile and Orange –
the smaller market players in the mobile market with 15% and 22% share respectively– 
merged their businesses, creating a much larger company with 28.4 million customers (BBC, 
2009). Most likely at the end of the process the brand name will be Orange. 
We have evaluated, as a real life investment, the entrant of the fourth operator, Yoigo, 
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in the Spanish mobile telecommunications industry. In Europe in general, and in Spain in 
particular, digital technology upgrades have led to a significant increase in the number of 
players. Starting with GSM (Global System for Mobile Communication) in the 90s –which is the 
most popular standard for mobile telephony systems in the world–, and later with the 
introduction of the UMTS (Universal Mobile Telecommunications System) in the year 2000, 
there has been a continuous increase in the number of players due to the allocation of 
radiofrequencies to new standards.  
Commonly, these companies have been valuing by simple Discount Cash Flows (DFC) 
models, forecasting and taking present values of cash flows based in organic growth, and 
building scenarios according to the probability density function of the variables chosen. 
However, our analysis of the entrant of Yoigo in the Spanish mobile telephony industry reveals 
that the sources of value of the investment are not only the present value of future cash flows 
as expected from the accepted investments, which is valued by DFC models, but also the 
value provided by the option to sell their business if things do not progress properly once it is 
up and running, which has to be valued through real options techniques.  
We estimate the value of this option to abandon the industry by using the proposal of 
Copeland and Antikarov (2001), which is adapted to the nature of the investment analysed. 
One of the most important parameters in the valuation of the option is the strike price which is 
assumed Yoigo could obtain selling its customer base. To identify this strike price, the increase 
in value of the entrant due to the increase in its margins at the level of a potential buyer is 
calculated. 
The information required for the case study is gathered from financial publications at 
the time of the investment, analysts’ forecasts, public documents presented to the market by 
Yoigo and finally, data collected from the professional experience of the authors in the industry. 
We estimate the investment value on 2006, coinciding with the beginning of Yoigo’s 
operations. 
The findings to emerge from the case study provide evidence to support the 
significance of real options in explaining the decision of Yoigo to entrant in the Spanish mobile 
telephony industry. The value of the option to abandon endorses the logic of Yoigos’s 
investment decision and contributes to justify the decision taken by the firm.  
The remainder of the work is structured as follows. The second section outlines the 
main features of the industry analysed. The third section provides the description of the 
methodology framework used for the valuation and the main results. Thus, this section 
includes, firstly, the valuation of the decision to entrant in the industry without considering 
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flexibility, the base case which is valued by DFC model, and secondly considering in an explicit 
manner the option to abandon which is valued by real options techniques. Also section three 
present the estimation of the strike price of the option and shows the main results in the option 
to abandon valuation. The paper closes with a summary of the main conclusions. 
 
2. OVERVIEW OF THE MOBILE TELEPHONE INDUSTRY IN SPAIN  
 
In this section we present the Spanish mobile telephone market in order to show its 
oligopolistic profile, with a limited number of players, high penetration –which tends to lower 
its growth–, low differentiation of services and the presence of network effects. These 
elements jointly drive to the existence of economies of scale which are also shown at the end 
of the section. 
 
2.1. Limited number of players 
 
The Spanish mobile telephone market, and major European markets, behaves as a pure 
oligopoly, consisting of a few companies that offer the same service (Kotler and Keller, 
2009). This mainly happens because the frequency bands required to operate are 
considered a scarce resource, and they are allocated by the Administration. As a 
consequence, there are currently only four players with frequency ownership in Spain which 
portrait a pattern of imperfect competition, since only a few companies are able to offer a 
specific product (Samuelson and Nordhaus, 1986).  
 
Telefónica, under the brand name “Movistar”, is the market leader; Vodafone 
operates under its own brand and is the second player; France Telecom, under the brand 
name “Orange”, is the third player and, since December 2006, Xfera Móviles S.A., under the 
brand name “Yoigo”, launched the fourth mobile operator. 
 
Only those companies are able to manage their own frequencies and consequently 
deploy their own network, although in some cases they share sites and provide national 
roaming to each other.  
 
Additionally to these Mobile Network Operators (MNOs) there are a number of Mobile 
Virtual Network Operators (MVNOs). These are companies that operate using other players’ 
networks and have a completely different operational cost structure. We do not consider 
these firms in the analysis, not only because of the aforementioned fact but also because 
their marginal presence in the market- under 2% market share in terms of number of lines 
(CMT, 2009). The Figure 1 shows the market share per company in 2008.  
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Fig. 1: Market share (% lines) of mobile operators, Spain 2008 
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Source: CMT Annual Report, 2009 
2.2. High penetration 
 
According to Merrill Lynch & Bank of America Global Wireless Matrix 4Q 2009, the 
penetration of mobile telephony in Spain, defined as number of subscribers divided per 
population, reaches 140%, close to Italy –highest in Western Europe– at 147%, and clearly 
over Germany, United Kingdom and France at 132%, 126% and 94% respectively.  
 
This reflects a very high penetration level at 54.1 millions of lines, shown in Table 1; 
additionally the growth rate forecasted for years 2010 and 2011 is clearly lower than in 
previous years, at 1.6% and 1.1% respectively. This shows that the market is close to 
saturation. 
 
Table 1: Total market customers evolution. 
CY09E CY10E CY11E 
Total Market ( 
mill) 54 055 54 902 55 521 
Yearly growth 3.0% 1.6% 1.1% 
Source: Merrill Llynch & Bank of America, Global Wireless Matrix 4Q09. 
 
2.3. Low differentiation of services 
 
Currently there is a low level of differentiation in services, they are mainly limited to voice, 
short messages (SMSs), and data services that are progressively increasing their weight in 
the services portfolio. 
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But, as Table 2 shows, 72% of industry revenues in Q3 2009 are due to voice 
services, in which differentiation is practically nil. 
 
Table 2: Total quarterly revenues in mobile telephony market Spain (million €) 
 2007 2008 2009 
 Q4 Q1 Q2 Q3 Q4 Q1 Q2 Q3 
Monthly fix fee 173 176 197 199 237 222 262 264 
  5% 5% 5% 5% 6% 6% 7% 7% 
Voice 2 923 2 829 2 852 2 903 2 706 2 554 2 612 2 698 
  77% 76% 76% 75% 73% 72% 72% 72% 
SMSs 448 443 420 431 451 426 377 379 
  12% 12% 11% 11% 12% 12% 10% 10% 
Data 225 248 271 296 294 313 344 384 
  6% 7% 7% 8% 8% 9% 10% 10% 
Other 27 28 31 31 33 24 24 31 
  1% 1% 1% 1% 1% 1% 1% 1% 
Total 3 796 3 725 3 770 3 860 3 721 3 539 3 618 3 756 
Source: CMT Quarterly report, 3Q 2009. 
 
Due to this low level of service differentiation, new entrants in the market have 
needed to compete in price to increase their number of customers, offering the same 
services at a discount. Figure 2 shows that Orange, the third entrant in the Spanish market, 
has consistently offered a discount that has had an impact on its average revenue per user.  
 
Fig. 2: Average Revenue Per User (ARPU) evolution, per operator 2003-2008, in €/month. 
20
25
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Telefonica Vodafone Orange
 
Source: Merrill Llynch & Bank of America, Global Wireless Matrix 4Q09 and own analysis. 
 
2.4. Network effects 
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Network effects exist if the usage of a product by any user increases or decreases the 
product’s value for other users (Katz and Shapiro, 1985). Technology adoption decisions, in 
the presence of network effects, are influenced by the size of a provider’s existing installed 
base in the market, as well as by expectations of its future size. The theory suggests that a 
product value increases due to usage by other users, thus creating a positive network effects 
(Katz and Shapiro, 1986). 
 
In the european mobile market, network effects are shown in the amounts paid 
between operators because of terminating calls. Operators with more customers will enjoy 
higher revenues due to fees of incoming calls finished in their networks, and also they benefit 
of higher savings as a consequence of “on-net traffic” – calls generated and finished in the 
same network - that do not pay termination fees. Table 3 shows revenues due to termination 
rates in Spain, due to traffic generated in competitors’ networks. It represents a very relevant 
amount -over 600 million € per quarter between Q4 2007 and Q3 2009. 
 
Table 3: Revenues due to termination rates in Spain (million €) 
 2007 2008 2009 
 Q4 Q1 Q2 Q3 Q4 Q1 Q2 Q3 
National 746 720 707 701 644 598 572 585 
Voice traffic 683 664 652 645 587 546 521 533 
MVNO Traffic 1 1 2 2 2 2 3 3 
SMSs 62 55 53 54 56 49 48 49 
International 48 50 48 59 42 45 44 53 
Voice traffic 38 39 37 46 31 30 31 37 
SMSs 10 11 11 12 12 15 12 16 
Total  795 770 755 760 687 643 616 638 
Source: CMT Quarterly report, 3Q 2009. 
 
3. METHODOLOGY FRAMEWORK FOR VALUATION  
 
When investing in new projects, firms worry about the risk that the investment will not pay off, 
and also about cash flows not meeting expectations. Having the option to abandon a project 
that does not pay off can be valuable, especially on projects with a significant potential for 
losses (Damodaran, 2002). Consequently, the fact that a new entrant in the Spanish mobile 
telecommunications market has the option to sell the company has a value.  
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For valuing the option to abandon we apply the methodology proposed by Copeland 
and Antikarov (2001). On the basis of Samuelson theorem (1965), these authors propose to 
reduce the sources of uncertainty in investment to a single-value variability of the project 
without options, which evolves over time as a random walk. 
To do that, firstly, an estimation of the investment present value without flexibility is 
provided, which is calculated by DCF model. The underlying asset of the embedded option is 
precisely the DCF value of the firm without options.  
Then the uncertainty is introduced in an explicit manner as the process followed by 
the variables identified as uncertain. Once modeled these variables, we used Monte Carlo 
simulation to generate the distribution in time present value of the investment without 
flexibility and the standard deviation of its rate of returnis estimated.  
Then, the binomial tree is constructed from the underlying values considering the 
reinvestment of cash flows, and the value of the option is determined. 
In Table 4 we present the methodology followed to calculate the option to abandon 
based upon four steps for the case of Yoigo investment. 
 
Table 4: Diagram of methodology followed. 
1.- Base case present value 
without flexibility using DCF
2.- Model the uncertainty 3.- Calculate strike price of the 
option to abandon
4.- Calculate the total value of the 
investment opportunity
1.1.- Analysis of EBITDA margin of 
entrant  vs. incumbents.
 2.1.- Specify uncertainties (price 
and customers).
3.1.- Calculation and definition of 
EBITDA margin vs. scale in the 
industry
4.1.- Evaluation of strike price at 
the end of periods
1.2.- Estimation of customers, 
price evolution, EBITDA and 
Capital Expenditures.
2.2.- Define and run Monte Carlo 
simulation .
3.2.- Calculation of incremental 
NPV vs. Incremental EBITDA due 
to gaining size.
4.2.- Calculation of the value of 
the option utilizing the risk 
neutral probability approach.
1.3.- Compute NPV of FCFs 
assuming a WACC and a growth 
rate ("g").
2.3.- Obtain standard deviation 
(volatility).
3.3.- The strike price of the option 
is the NPV including incremental 
EBITDA due to larger size.
4.3.- Calculation of total value of 
the investment opportunity 
including the option to abandon.
 
 
3.1. First step: Base case present value without flexibility using DFC 
 
As previously pointed out, there are clear economies of scale in the Spanish mobile 
telephony industry, because investments in network infrastructure, sales and marketing costs 
are in the same range due to the fact that the four operators operate nationwide and address 
the same market.  
 
These economies are evident as per the strong correlation between revenues and 
EBITDA margin. As shown in the Figure 3, operators with higher in revenues, enjoy higher 
EBITDA margins. And, consequently, a new entrant with less customers and lower revenues 
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would have lower EBITDA margins while in the process of increasing its number of 
customers. As presented in the attached figure, it is estimated that a new entrant in the 
Spanish market such as Yoigo, would have an EBITDA margin between 10% and 20% until 
reaching a number of customers over 5 million. In our case we have assumed an optimistic 
scenario of 20%, in line also with Merrill Llynch & Bank of America estimations (2009). It also 
can be appreciated in the figure that increasing those margins could be difficult because of 
the progressive margin erosion due to market maturity. 
 
 
Fig. 3: EBITDA Margin (%) vs. number of customers (´000), Spain 2003 – 2008 
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Source: Merrill Llynch & Bank of America, Global Wireless Matrix 4Q09 and own analysis. 
 
A consequence of the diagram presented in Figure 3 is that players already present in 
the market (incumbents) are able to extract more value from the same customers, because 
of having a higher EBITDA margin. Thus, there should be an option to sell to them the 
customer base at a premium. As we can see in the next section, we calculate the strike price 
of the option to abandon based on this fact. 
 
As a starting point of the valuation, we calculate the NPV of Yoigo, the fourth player in 
the Spanish mobile telephony market, as if we were in 2006 at the moment of launching the 
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company. In order to do that we make some assumptions regarding number of customers, 
ARPU (Average Revenue per User and Month), and also CAPEX (Capital Expenditures per 
year). We have made these assumptions based on our professional experience providing 
advice to the shareholders of Xfera Móviles S.A. between 2000 and 2004, and taking into 
account updated data from Investment Banks research (Merrill Lynch & Bank of America, 
2009), as detailed in Table 5. 
 
Table 5: NPV of Yoigo and assumptions (figures in million € and (´000) for customers). 
MARKET ( #Subscribers) 2006 2007 2008 2009 2010 2011 2012 2013 2014 2015 2016
Total market 47 047 50 155 52 487 54 055 54 903 55 522 56 077 56 638 57 204 57 776 58 354
Market growth 6,2% 4,4% 2,9% 1,5% 1,1% 1,0% 1,0% 1,0% 1,0% 1,0%
INVESTMENT PROPOSAL 2006 2007 2008 2009 2010 2011 2012 2013 2014 2015 2016
Customers (Annual equivalent)  0  500 1 048 1 620 2 194 2 774 3 363 3 963 4 575 5 198 5 834
Market share 1,0% 2,0% 3,0% 4,0% 5,0% 6,0% 7,0% 8,0% 9,0% 10,0%
SALES 135 269 395 508 610 703 787 863 931 993
ARPU (Monthly/customer) 25 22,5 21,4 20,3 19,3 18,3 17,4 16,5 15,7 14,9 14,2
EBITDA 27 54 79 102 122 141 157 173 186 199
EBITDA / Sales (%) 20% 20% 20% 20% 20% 20% 20% 20% 20% 20% 20%
CAPEX 300 25 50 75 100 100 100 100 100 100 100
Capex / Sales (%) 19% 19% 19% 20% 16% 14% 13% 12% 11% 10%
Op FCF -300 2 4 4 2 22 41 57 73 86 99 101
Op FCF including terminal value -300 2 4 4 2 22 41 57 73 86 99 2.030
Accumulated  Op. FCF -300 -298 -294 -290 -289 -267 -226 -169 -96 -10 88
PV of FCF  782 1 168 1 260 1 356 1 461 1 576 1 678 1 769 1 848 1 918 1 978 2 030
FCF as % of NPV -38,4% 0,2% 0,3% 0,3% 0,1% 1,4% 2,4% 3,2% 3,9% 4,5% 5,0%
WACC 8%
g 3%
NPV 782
ASSUMPTIONS.
1.- Customers.
 - Customers starting pont: the first year 1% market share that equals 500.000, real figure 2007 according to Bank of America (2009) was 427.000.
 - Customer growth: 1% annual growth. In line with Bank of America estimation for 2009 at 3%. 
2.- ARPU (Average monthly total revenue per user)
 - Starting point: 22,5€ in 2007, 10% under Oranges ARPU.
 - Evolution: -5%/yr. decrease in line with 2003-2008 average market evolution (-7%) according to CMT (Comisión del Mercado de las Telecomunicaciones) 
   and with estimations of Bank of America of  20€ for Yoigo in 2009.
3.- EBITDA
 - 20% in line with Bank of America estimation for 2009
 - Evolution: constant while being under 10% market share.
4.- CAPEX
 - Initial investment of 300m€ to develop a network of 3.000 sites according to our estimation of number of sites. (aproximately 1/3 Oranges network).
 - Evolution: around 20% sales until it reaches a comparable size vs. current players that are at 10% - 12% Capex/sales. 
5.- WACC and g
 - WACC=8% in line with Bank of America estimations for Telefonica in the Spanish mobile market.
 - g= 3% according to our experience in the moment of launching Yoigo.
 
Source: Own analysis and market figures based Merrill Llynch & Bank of America, Global Wireless Matrix 4Q09. 
 
As presented in previous Table 5, the NPV of the investment proposal is positive at 782 
million €, which allows us to justify the decision taken by the Yoigo board to take part in the 
Spanish mobile telecommunications market. However, we can make several comments in 
order to provide a better understanding of this valuation. Fistly, we can see that the launching 
of Yoigo requires a significant investment, with a peak funding of 300 million €, and 
only, after ten years of operation, the company is able to reach positive accumulated 
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free cash flow. Secondly, we can see that the NPV lies mainly in the terminal value of 
the investment (2 030 m€ in the year 2017) which depends critically of the cash flows 
growth rate “g”. Thirdly, we assume the WACC to be 8%, it is based in the figures 
used by investment banks such as Merrill Lynch Bank of America for Telefónica, and 
currently 8% is also utilized frequently in the Spanish mobile telecom industry to 
value every player independently of its size, it is due to the difficulty to assume a 
different level of risk in the long run for a similar móbile operator – Yoigo is owned 
TeliaSonera, the large and experienced sweden mobile operator -  operating in the 
same market.   
The Figure 4 shows the amount of initial disbursement and the evolution of flows, 
without discounting, between 2006 and 2016 (expressed in million €) and before considering 
the terminal value. As we mention before, the company reach positive accumulated free cash 
flow after ten years of operations.  
Fig. 4: Cash flow evolution 2006 – 2016 (million 
€)
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3.2. Second step: Modeling the uncertainty using event trees 
 
Once we have estimated the NPV of the new entrant Yoigo, we proceed to model the causal 
uncertainties of the investment. In this case, we consider that the major source of uncertainty 
is the evolution in number of customers because, as we can see in Table 6, price variations 
11 
 
are strongly correlated to customers growth rate. Thus, in the Spanish market for the period 
between 2002 and 2008 we have found a slope between customers growth rate and price 
variations (in percentage) of -0.6, meaning that 1% market growth relates to a 0.6% price 
decrease, with a R2 factor of 99.1%.  
 
Table 6: Correlation between customer growth rate and price decrease in the Spanish market 
Evolution 2002 2003 2004 2005 2006 2007 2008
Total market customers (´000) 33 530 37 507 39 161 43 114 47 047 50 155 52 487
(1) % Growth 12% 4% 10% 9% 7% 5%
Average market ARPU (€/month) 25,0 23,5 22,8 20,0 18,4 17,2 16,3
(2) % decrease -6% -3% -12% -8% -6% -5%
Slope between (1 and 2) -0,60
R2  between (1 and 2) 99,1%
 
Source: Own analysis from CMT 2009 and Merrill Llynch & Bank of America Global Matrix, 2009. 
 
Due to the nature of the project (a startup), the short life of the industry –the digital 
mobile telephony sector in Spain started in 1995– but also due to the evolution of the market, 
that has grown up very quickly, it would be difficult to assume that past years growth figures 
would be replicated. Consequently we use management estimates, as presented by 
Copeland and Antikarov (2001) to model the source of uncertainty number of customers. We 
assume a estimation that the total number of customers will be over 1 million by 2016. To 
estimate the volatility we assume lognormal distribution and, thus, we follow the equation 
recommended by Copeland and Antikarov (2001).  
 
 
were T is the number of periods considered, Σri is the sum of the period growths, V0 is the 
starting number of customers (we assume 0.5 million after 1 year, -reality has been 0.43 
million), and VTLower is the lower forecasted number of customers, representing the worst 
case scenario according to management expectations at the end of the periods considered. 
We assume this worst case to be 1 million customers by 2016. 
 
Next we run Monte Carlo simulation. For each year we define a log-normally 
distributed random variable, customer evolution (Q). Where ε is a random number N(0,1) and 
µ is the average growth for the periods considered.  
 
 
As we mention before, we assume that price variation is strongly correlated with the 
customer evolution, being the R2 of the regression between customers growth rate and price 
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variations (in percentage) of 99.1% shown in Table 6. Every time we run Monte Carlo 
Simulation, price variations are also run. 
Using this process we obtain many simulated sets of customers and ARPUs for the 
forecasted years. Once these values are simulated at different time intervals, we 
obtain the value of the flows corresponding to these simulations and from these the 
current value of the project at every moment. 
Because Samuelson theorem1 is based on the rate of the asset considered, 
the current values of the project obtained from the simulations must be processed in 
rates of return using the following relationship, 



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 +
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,1,1ln
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where zn variables represent the values obtained for continuous performance rates of 
the project value between period t-1and t, and n is the number of simulations. Note 
that in the above expression PV0 variable is constant and coincides with the current 
value of the project flow without uncertainty, while PV1 is calculated as 
( )∑= −+=
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For 10 000 trials, the distribution of the rate of return for the project NPV is lognormal 
with a mean value of 8.4%. The volatility (standard deviation) of the rate of return is 21.5%. 
 
3.3. Third step: Calculation on the strike price of the option to abandon 
 
Our thesis is that the company is assuming a risky investment opportunity because it has 
always the option to abandon the business if it does not perform adequately and does not 
reach the financial targets foreseen in terms of NPV. Specifically, the shareholders could 
decide to sell the business; and, due to the economies of scale, a higher value could be 
extracted from the same customers. 
 
                                                 
1
 Samuelson theorem states that the rate of return of an asset follow a random walk whatever the evolution of the 
flows generated by those assets are expected in the future, given that investors have complete information on these 
flows. 
Following Copeland and Antikarov, the application of this theorem is very useful for valuing real options, because if 
all sources of uncertainty affecting the flows of a project are reducet to a single uncertainty - the rate of return of the 
project - and if this rate of return follows a random walk, then you can use a binomial framework for project appraisal. 
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At this point it is important to mention the sensitivity of the NPV to EBITDA margin 
variations. In our assumptions we have considered an EBITDA margin for Yoigo of 20%, and 
as it can be seen in the Table 7, a 5% increase in the EBITDA margin, from 20% to 25% 
means that the company increases its NPV in 80% from 782 m€ to 1 408 m€. 
 
This means that incumbent operators with higher EBITDA margins are able to extract 
much more value from the same customers so they would be willing to pay a premium for 
Yoigo business.  
 
Table 7: Sensitivity of NPV (million €) to EBITDA margin variations. 
EBITDA Margin NPV Diference vs. 20%
15%  156 -80%
20%  782 0%
25% 1 408 80%
30% 2 034 160%
35% 2 660 240%
 
 
In the Spanish mobile market, the closest competitor to Yoigo is Orange, which has a 
24% EBITDA margin in 2009 (Merryl Llynch & Bank of American, 2009). Thus, we could 
assume that the company resulting from a potential merge (Orange plus Yoigo) could have 
at least an EBITDA margin of 25%2.  
 
Although Movistar or Vodafone could be the ones that potentially could extract more 
value from Yoigo customers, the reality is that they would face relevant issues to serve a 
lower quality customer base –as reflected in their ARPU– such as having to offer lower tariffs 
to their current customer base. Even more relevant could be the possibility of losing these 
custormer in favour of Orange that is offering cheaper tariffs and is used to serve that 
customer profile. On the other hand, Orange customers are much more similar –in terms of 
ARPU– to Yoigo customers, and they also have the incentive to increase its EBITDA margin 
through merging operations (proportionally more than Movistar or Vodafone). Consequently, 
we assume that the option to abandon would be to sell the company, and the most likely 
scenario should be that of a deal between the two smaller players: Orange and Yoigo3.   
 
                                                 
2
 In our case we assume that there are not regulatory restrictions to sell - or hire - mobile  frequiencies or mobile 
licences, which is the guideline European regulation is following, it could be different in other regions or countries. 
 
3
 A similar situation happened in the UK in 2009 when T-mobile and Orange merged their operations, although other 
alternatives could also be taken into account. 
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The strike price of the option to abandon is calculated as the increase in NPV due to 
higher EBITDA margins that would be generated from the same customers by an alternative 
player with larger scale. In our case the strike price would be based in a 5% EBITDA 
increase that would generate an 80% NPV increase. 
 
Consequently, the strike price is variable since will change depending on the 
simulated values for the number of customers. That is, although the strike price is based 
on a fixed EBITDA margin increase that generates a fixed NPV increase, the value depends 
upon the customers reached in every period. Additionally a sensitivity analysis could be 
made using a range of incremental EBITDAs (i.e. between 2.5% and 7.5% instead of a fixed 
5%). We think that this approach is a much more realistic manner than the traditional 
approaches based in a fixed strike price of the option to abandon which does not change 
during the life of the project, and also helps to gain a deeper understanding of the value of 
the business. 
 
 
3.4. Step four: Total value of the investment opportunity 
 
To calculate the value of the company including the option to abandon we use a discrete 
multiplicative binomial event tree. Differently from models in continuous time, such as those 
by Black and Scholes (1973) and Merton (1973), a discrete setting helps to clarify the 
economic principles underlying option pricing. The main reason to use a discrete setting, 
however, is that there are not closed form solutions in continuous time for American put 
options as it is presented in the case. Binomial trees provide a simple set up to value such 
American derivatives. 
 
To construct the event tree of the NPV we use upside change “u” and downside 
change “d” as proposed by Cox, Ross, and Rubinstein (1979). 
 
 
being σ the volatility of the underlying asset (which is the Present Value) and t the time step. 
This way we find “u” and “d” values, and build a binomial tree that we calculate following the 
process proposed by Copeland and Antikarov (2001). Table 8 shows the event tree 
before introducing options. 
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Table 8: Event tree (million €) 
Up (u) = 1.239984
Down (d) = 0.806461
Present Value before dividends (dividends = CF)
2006 2007 2008 2009 2010 2011 2012 2013 2014 2015 2016
1 081.9 1 168.4 1 446.4 1 788.1 2 210.7 2 738.3 3 347.3 4 047.9 4 851.2 5 769.8 6 817.6
940.7 1 162.9 1 437.8 1 780.9 2 177.0 2 632.6 3 155.1 3 752.6 4 434.1
Capex (Yr 1) 756.3 935.1 1 158.3 1 415.9 1 712.2 2 052.0 2 440.6 2 883.8
300.0 608.2 753.3 920.9 1 113.6 1 334.6 1 587.3 1 875.6
489.9 598.9 724.3 868.0 1 032.4 1 219.8 
389.5 471.0 564.5 671.4 793.4
306.4 367.2 436.7 515.9
238.8 284.0 335.6
184.7 218.3
142.0
PV1 = PVo x u (or) PV0 x d
 
 
The next step is to calculate the effect of the FCF in the present value of every single 
period; we calculate it as a percentage of the present value as described by Copeland and 
Antikarov (2001) and presented in Table 9. 
 
Table 9: CF of every period as a percentage of PV (million €) 
CF as a % of PV
2006 2007 2008 2009 2010 2011 2012 2013 2014 2015 2016
-27.7% 0.2% 0.3% 0.3% 0.1% 1.4% 2.5% 3.3% 4.1% 4.7% 5.2%
CF calculated for every period as a proportion of the PV
2006 2007 2008 2009 2010 2011 2012 2013 2014 2015 2016
-300.0 2.0 4.3 5.2 2.4 38.8 82.8 135.6 198.1 271.6 357.4
2.8 3.4 1.6 25.2 53.9 88.2 128.8 176.7 232.5
2.2 1.0 16.4 35.0 57.3 83.8 114.9 151.2
0.7 10.7 22.8 37.3 54.5 74.7 98.3
6.9 14.8 24.3 35.4 48.6 64.0
9.6 15.8 23.1 31.6 41.6
10.3 15.0 20.6 27.1
9.8 13.4 17.6
8.7 11.4
7.4
CF = (% of NPV) x (PV before dividends)
 
Now, we are able to calculate the Binomial tree extracting the FCF for every period 
and identifying the cells were the value is under the expected present value in the previous 
DCF valuation, as presented in Table 10. We have defined the criteria that we would 
abandon the business when that happens because that would mean that we are not reaching 
our initial financial targets. 
 
The strike price of the option in those cases would be the present value of the 
business in that moment incremented by the 80% due to the higher NPV extracted to the 
customer base by a competitor when being sold. 
16 
 
 
 
Table 10: Current tree ex outflows identifying cells where PV is under expectations (million €) 
 
Expected NPV
2006 2007 2008 2009 2010 2011 2012 2013 2014 2015 2016
781.9 1 168.4 1 259.8 1 356.5 1 460.7 1 575.8 1 678.1 1 768.6 1 848.2 1 917.8  1 978.1
Current tree ex-CF
2006 2007 2008 2009 2010 2011 2012 2013 2014 2015 2016
781.9 1 166.4 1 442.0 1 782.9 2 208.3 2 699.4 3 264.4 3 912.3 4 653.1 5 498.2 6 460.2
937.9 1 159.5 1 436.2 1 755.7 2 123.1 2 544.5 3 026.3 3 575.9 4 201.6
754.1 934.1 1 141.8 1 380.8 1 654.9 1 968.2 2 325.7 2 732.6
607.5 742.6 898.1 1 076.3 1 280.1 1 512.6 1 777.3
483.0 584.1 700.0 832.6 983.8 1 155.9
379.9 455.3 541.5 639.8 751.8
296.1 352.2 416.1 488.9
229.0 270.6 318.0
Value < Expected PV 176.0 206.8
134.5
 
 
 
To calculate the value of the option in every period we use the risk neutral probability 
approach, where rf is the risk free rate, in our case we use 3.53% which is an average 
interest rate of Spanish Public debt that we have calculated for 2006 (Tesoro Público, 2009), 
and “u” and “d” are the up and down movements presented before. 
 
 
 
Applying these probabilities, we obtain the value of the option to abandon in a 
recursive way, starting from the final period of time and moving back until the begining. Thus, 
we obtain a present value for the option to abandon of 555 million €, as it is shown in Table 
11. This value of the option is clearly positive and can be added to the present value of the 
business without flexibility utilizing DCF at 782 million to provide a better estimation of the 
investment value. 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
17 
 
Table 11: Value of the option to abandon due to incremental EBITDA (NPV*(1+0.8)) (million €) 
 
 
2006 2007 2008 2009 2010 2011 2012 2013 2014 2015 2016
0,0 0,0
555,1 574,6
750,8 928,2
1.260,1 1.790,9
603,7 747,8 914,1 1.105,4
760,7 1.036,0 1.446,9 2.064,2
486,3 594,5 718,9 861,6 1.024,7
509,9 654,2 864,8 1.195,0 1.747,7
386,6 467,6 560,4 666,5 787,5
 - Exercise the option 377,1 451,9 537,5 635,1 746,2
 - Continue 304,1 364,4 433,5 512,2
293,9 349,6 413,1 485,3
237,0 281,9 333,1
227,4 268,6 315,6
183,4 216,6
174,7 205,3
140,9
133,5
0,0 0,0 0,0 0,0 0,0 0,0 0,0 0,0 0,0
2.586,0 0,0 0,0 0,0 0,0 0,0 0,0
2.979,6 0,0 0,0 0,0
2.723,4 3.200,0
925,3
601,8
391,4
254,6
165,6
107,7
Strike price of the Option =
1,80 x PV - PV
 
As represented in Figure 5 the total value of the new entrant, including the option to 
abandon, would be 1 336.9 million € if we consider a 80% NPV increase due to 5% EBITDA 
increase. Although the traditional NPV of Yoigo investment allows us to accept the project, a 
correct valuation of the new entrant requires consider all sources of value. Taking into 
account the option to abandon, the Extended NPV of Yoigo is higher than the traditional NPV 
and so it is much easier to explain that the shareholders should assume this investment 
proposal.  
 
Fig. 5: Total value of the business including the option (million €). 
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4. CONCLUSIONS  
 
This paper presents an in-depth analysis of the sources of value for the case of an 
investment of a new entrant in an oligopolistic market. We approach the creation of value in 
the decision of launching Yoigo, the fourth operator in the Spanish mobile 
telecommunications market, through the real options method. From this perspective, the 
value of the investment in launching Yoigo derives jointly from its expected cash flows 
without flexibility and the option to abandon de market by selling its business or merging 
with a competitor.  
Each component of the value of the new entrant has to be evaluated with appropriate 
techniques. Thus, for valuing the value of the investment without flexibility we use models 
based on discounted cash flows and for valuing the option to abandon we employ Real Option 
techniques. 
Our analysis of this real investment case provides new evidence about the 
relevance of sources of value which differ from direct cash flow. The economies of 
scale present in the mobile telecommunicatins industry allow a new entrant in the market to 
consider the option to sell its customers base to larger players if it does not reach its 
business targets, because they are able to extract more value from the same customer base.  
To estimate the value of the option to abandon the industry, we apply the 
proposal of Copeland and Antikarov (2001), which is adapted to the nature of the 
investment analysed. One of the most important parameters in the valuation of the 
option is the strike price. Again, due to the economies of scale present in the 
industry, the strike price of the option to abandon can be calculated using the incremental 
NPV caused by higher EBITDA margins. This is a relevant point in the valuation and  is a 
distinguishing element vs. traditional methods were the abandonment value did not change 
during the life of the project. 
We have found that the value of the option to abandon to be positive and 
contribute to justify the investment strategy made at the time by Yoigo. A correct 
valuation of the new entrant in a oligopolistic market requires consider all sources of value. 
Taking into account the option to abandon, the Extended NPV of Yoigo is higher than the 
traditional NPV and so it is much easier to explain that the shareholders should assume this 
investment proposal. 
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